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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-

UNITED GEOPHYSICAL COMPANY, a
Foreign Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
11362

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action by the Utah State Division of
Fish and Game, the Plaintiff and appellant, against
the United Geophysical Company, Defendant and
respondent. The Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for the killing of fish at Bear Lake,
Utah, arising from the detonation of explosives by
Defendant at Bear Lake. The Plaintiff's action was
based on theory of breach of contract and detrimental reliance upon representations made by Defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In early 1963, the Defendant, United Geophysical Company, contacted the Utah State Division of
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Fish and Game to obtain permission to conduct
underwater detonations in Flaming Gorge Reservoir
and in Bear Lake. The wording of one of the letters
addressed to Director Crane, requesting such permission is as follcws:
Dear Sir:
"United ElectroDynamics, Inc., under contract to
the the United States Geological Survey, is engaged
in studying seismic propogation paths and regional
travel times in the western United States as a part
of the VELA UNIFORM Program of the Advanced
Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense.
In conjunction with this work, chemical explosions
will be detonated at several places in this region
and the seismic waves generated by these explosions
will be recorded at various distances.
This is a request for permission to use Flaming
Gorge Reservoir as one of the shot locations. We
also wish to use Bear Lake. The site selected is at
Jarvies Canyon, approximately 7 miles upstream
from the dam. Four or five shots would be fired on
consecutive days, the maximum charge size for any
one shot being 6,000 pounds. The program is expected to start May 22, 1968, and continue until
May 25 or 26, 1968.
United ElectroDynamics, Inc., assumes responsibility and any resulting liabilities entailed in the
use of this reservoir as a shot location.
Permission has been obtained from the Chief Engineer, Bureau of Reclamation, United States Department of Interior, to use Flaming Gorge Reservoir as a shot location. Any game fish killed as a
result of these explosions would be re-stocked by
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United ElcctroDynamics, Inc., in a manner .that is
agreeable to the Utah Fish and Game Department.
Yours truly,
Orville Strozier, Project Manager
Engineering Geophysics Department
United Geo Measurements Division

This letter was one of several received by the
Plaintiff from either the United Geophysical Company or the United States Geological Services. The
Defendant was engaged in the detonation of explosives and the recording of seismographic readings throughout the United States on a contract with
the Geological Services. The Defendants represented, as is shown by the contents of the letter, that
they agreed to "assume responsibility and any resulting liabilities entailed in the use of this reservoir
as a shot location." The Defendant further stated that
any game fish killed as a result of these explosions
would be restocked by United ElectroDynamics,
Inc., in a manner that is agreeable to the Utah State
Division of Fish and Game Department.
Based upon these and other representations
made by the Defendant the Utah State Division of
Fish and Game Commission granted permission to
the Defendant to conduct the detonations at Bear
Lake and Flaming Gorge Reservoir. As a direct .result of these explosions a substantial number of indigenous Peak-Nosed Bonneville Cisco were killed
and some Lake Trout or Mackinaw and Whitefish
were also killed.
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In reliance upon the representations, agreements, and promises made by the Defendant, the
Plaintiff requested compensation in terms of money
for the killing and destruction of fish at Bear Lake;
and the Defendant refused to pay, claiming among
other things, that no contract had been entered into
for the payment of damages and that any representations made by the Defendant was limited to Flaming Gorge Reservoir, and did not apply to Bear Lake.
Upon the Defendant's refusal to pay, the Plaintiff
demanded that the Defendants restock fish in Bear
Lake in a manner suitable to the Plaintiffs. The Defendant also refused to restock in a manner suitable
to Plaintiff's claim. The Plaintiff, therefore, initiated
action, based upon contract and detrimental reliance made by the Defendants, in an effort to obtain damages for the killing and destruction of the
fish.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT, AND THE PLEADINGS, FILES, RECORDS,
AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT ESTABLISHES
SUFFICIENT ISSUES TO BE HEARD RY THE TRIER
OF FACTS.

The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was based upon the following alleged defects in
Plaintiff's case:
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1. No contract existed between the Plaintiff
and the Defendant regarding the assumption of liability by the Plaintiff in its use of Bear Lake as a site
to detonate explosives.

2. If a contract existed between the Plaintiff
and the Defendant regarding the use of Bear Lake
as one of the sites to conduct the Defendant's experiments, the contract is impossible of performance because of the peculiarity of the fish involved,
and the difficulty to assess market values of the
Cisco Fish and the Whitefish defeats the Plaintiff's
claim for damages.
3. If the contract existed between the parties
in reference to Bear Lake, the contract was too ambiguous to require the Defendant to perform its obligations.
The State of Utah, by and through its Division
of Fish and Game is not entitled to br]ng a lawsuit
as owners of the fish destroyed.
5. Cisco Fish is not a game fish and the contract was limited to compensation for destruction of
game fish.
6.
Utah.

No injury was sustained by the State of

The arguments submitted by the Defendant
enumerated as numbers l, 2, and 3, which relate to
the question of contract and interpretation of contract, will be answered together under one heading;
and the arguments submitted by the Defendant
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shown as numbers 4, 5, and 6 will be answered individually.
Contracts
Plaintiff does not rely solely upon the letter from
Defendant dated May 9, 1963, as the entire contract.
First, there appears to be substantial confusion in
Defendant's own opinion as to exactly what its written contract in the letter of May 9, 1963, does mean.
Defendant now contends that the letter-contract refers only to Flaming Gorge Reservoir, yet the letter
specifically states that "We also wish to use Bear
Lake." Defendant now contends the letter-contract
refers only to restocking any game fish killed as a
result of these explosions, yet the letter also "assumes responsibility and any resulting liabilities entailed in the use of this reservoir as a shot location."
Obviously, on its face the letter of May 9, 1963,
is ambiguous and confusing. It could not possibly
form the written instrument embodying all aspects
of the parties' agreement, necessary for the application of the parol evidence rule. It is well established
that before there can be a valid application of the
parol evidence rule, there must be in existence, a
writing which is susceptible to interpretation as to
what exactly it means.
"No parol evidence that is offered can be said to
vary or contradict a writing until by process of
interpretation it is determined that the writing
means." Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 579 (1960).
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The Utah Court has said, referring to a written contract assignment:
"Whenever uncertainty or ambiguity exists with
respect thereto it is proper for the Court to consider all the facts and circumstances, including the
word and actions of the parties forming the background of the transaction." Radley vs. Smith, 6 Utah
2nd 314, 313 P. 2nd 465 (1967).

It seems obvious then that all communications
and correspondence must be referred to in order to
interpret the terms of the agreement entered into
and that when this is done, Defendant agreed to assume full responsibility for damages arising out of
the use of Bear Lake and Flaming Gorge Reservoir
as shot sites for their study.
Secondly, the evidence is undisputed that
sometime subsequent to the receipt of the May 9,
1963, letter the Defendant's agent, in a telephone
conversation with the then Fish and Game Director,
Harold S. Crane, gave extensive verbal assurances
that losses in Bear Lake would be minimal and that,
in any event, Defendant would assume full responsibility for any lesses. (See deposition of Harold S.
Crane, Page 9, lines 25 forward.) It is certainly well
established that the parol evidence rule does not
relate to and d'.Jes not prevent proof of oral contracts
entered into subsequent to the formal written contract, varying or discharging the written agreement.
(See 3 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 632 (3rd Edition);
Simpson Handbook on the Law of Contracts, Sec. 63,
(1954).
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If, as the Defenda11t contends on one hand, no
agreement was entered into with regard to the damage done in Bear Lalce jn the letter of May 9, 1963,
then the subsequent conversations between Defendant's agent and Director Crane, constituted a
separate oral cor~tract. Defendant rnay no~ e~:c\1c11.
these convers.::1tions from the contract on parol
grounds and still contend that no agreernent vv1:i::;
made. Obviously, such an agreement was made because Defendant vvent ahead with its blasting. The
agreement contained in the letter of May 9, 1963, is
either modified by the subsequent conversations t0
include both greater assurances and assurances as
to Bear Lake or the con'rersations comprise a separate oral contract relating to Bear Lake alone.
The rule is that subsequent agreements may be
shown by parol evidence and are not barred or
rendered ineffective by a prior writing. (See 3 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 632 (3rd Edition); 3 Corbin
on Contracts Sec. 594, (1960).
The Defendant may not have its cake and eat it
both since it is inconceivable that Plaintiff would
consent to debnation of Twelve Thousand (12,000)
Pounds of high explosives in any fishery waters of
the State of Utah without assurances regarding pos
sible damage to the fishery involved. In fact, the
Plaintiff did so only on the assurances of the United
States Government and Defendant; first, that Defendant was a reputable and honorable concern;
and second, that Defendant would assume full responsibility for all_ res11lting damages. Defendant

9
should not now be heard to say that this reliance
was unwairanted in both regards.
Finally, it would seem ironical if a party were
permitted to take advantage of ambiguity created by
him to defeat a contract which he has benefitted
from. However, the decisions clearly show that a
party may not use ambiguity created by him to immunize himself against an action for redress of a
breach of contract. In l'v1aw vs. Noble, 354 P. 2nd 121,
10 Utah 2nd 440, the Ccurt stated:
"We are in agreement with the recognized rule
urged by the Defendants that where there is uncertainty or ambiguity the contract should be
strictly construed against him who draws it."

If the contract is in fact ambiguous as claimed
by the Defendartts such ambiguity should be construed against it as the drafter or the proposer of the
contract.
Valuation Of Property Having No Market Vaiue
Because Of Its Peculiar Nature.
The Defendant contends, among other things,
that the Plaintiff's case must fail because of the impossibility of determining damages of the fish killed
due to the peculiar nature of the peak-nosed Bonne-v-ill_.e, Cisco, the Rodcy Mountain Whitefish, and the
Lake Trout or Mackinaw, and because these fish
0re not ordinarily scld on the market and, therefore,
h::ive no established market value.
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The Courts have long since established a rule
however, which permits a party to testify as to a.c
tual, intrinsic or subjective values where the value
of the item, because of its peculiarity, cannot be assessed by the ordinary rule of market value.
I

The Utah precedent was apparently set in
Kamas Security Company vs. Taylor, 226 P. 2nd 11 l,
119 Utah 241. In that case the Utah Supreme Court,
in permitting the lov1rer Court to assess damages
on the basis of intrinsic value, stated:
"The mere fact that the market value could not be
shown by reason of the want of any listing on the
Stock Exchange, and that there was only occasional
transfer of this type of stock could not preclude
Plaintiff from recovering judgment for more than
nominal damap.-e. 1'he trial court was entitled to
make a finding of value based on intrinsic worth of
the stock. Although market value is a general criterion of value, it is not the sole criterion."

The same rule was stated differently in Park vs.
Moorman Manufacturing Company, et al., 241 P.
2nd 914, 121 Utah 339. The Court in approving the
use of a method of valuation, other than market
value, stated:
"A problem arises, however, where, as in this case,
there is no market value of the property destroyed
since laying hens above the age of five months are
not generally available, and a market value must be
arrived at by a process of computation. Hence, in
order to determine the value of Plaintiff's loss, we
must start with a base and compute the incidentals
which would be included in a mC1rket price of the
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destroyed object i.f it had been obtainable on the
open market."

This rule, a.s established by the Supreme Court
of Utah, is a confirmation of the general rule accepted by all of our sister states. The general rule
is clearly stated in 22 AM. JUR. 2nd 214, Damaqes.
Section 249.
"There are many instances in which the item of
personal property destroyed, injured, or taken has
no market value in the normal sense of that term.
A family photograph, a specially designed machine,
a manuscript, some lecture notes, and plans of a
draftsman can be examples of items of personal
property which have no market value beyond the
value of the paper or material which went into their
construction. These items are not bought and sold
on the open market, and continued adherence to the
rule of damages which allows recovery only for a decrease in 'market value' would result in awarding
the Plaintiff only nominal damages even though the
court is convinced that the injury is substantial. In
this type of case, the concept of measuring damages
by the market value of the item, destroyed, injured,
or taken is often discarded by the courts. The rule
most frequently adopted for these cases is to award
either the 'actual' or 'intrinsic' value of the item or
the 'value to the owner' of the item."

The Riqht Of The Utah Division Of Fish And Game
To Sue For Loss Or Destruction Of Fish.
There is no merit to the contention that the State
of Utah has no property rights in fish therein. The
Utah State Legislature has expressly stated:
"All Game and fish now and hereinafter within this
state, not held by private ownership legally ac-
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quired, and which, for the purpose of this law, shall
include all game animals, game birds, water fowl,
fish, amphibians, and fur-bearing animals, mentioned in this law are expressly declared to be the
property of the State, .... Utah Code Annotated,
1953, 23-1-10. (Emphasis added)

There should be little dispute that even without a statutory declaration as to the ownership of
wildlife, that all wildlife within each state are held
in trust, by the state government, for the people of
that state. Logically, the state agency which is responsible for the maintenance of the wildlife should
be entitled to maintain an action in behalf of the public of that state.
Definition Of Game Fish

Cisco fish have long been regarded as game
fish by the Utah Fish and Game Department because they are members of the Whitefish family,
Prosopium. See Sigler & Miller, Fishes of Utah, P.
185, (1963). If this is not sufficient, then under the
law of the State of Utah, the sole test of whether or
not Cisco Fish are game fish is whether or not they
have been so declared by the Utah State Fish and
Game Commission.
"Game fish means all species of Trout, Bass, Salmon, Pike, Catfish, Crappie, Whitefish, Grayling,
and such other species as may be declared game by
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the Commission and which are not raised in private
fish hatcheries." Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
23-1-9, Para. 11. (Emphasis added).

Angling regulations and bag limits were set for
Bonneville Cisco as game fish by the Utah Fish and
Game Commission in its official proclamation dated
December 23, 1959. (See Utah Fish and Game Department. 1960, Angling Regulations. Para. A-3-c and
A-3-h.) Any inquiry into the method of taking as a
means of defining game fish would lead to the absurd result that many species would sometimes be
game fish and sometimes not, since many are frequently legally taken by methods involving neither
rod nor reel.

Damages
Whether or not the Cisco, Whitefish, or Lake
Trout populations were damaged or their spawning
beds injured are questions of fact upon which evidence will be adduced at trial. The indisputable fact
is that an exceedingly large number of game fish
were killed by the Defendant's activities. The question of whether or not the State of Utah suffered
any damage by reason of Defendant's activities and
if so, how much, are questions to be answered at
trial and are not susceptible to disposition at pretrial proceedings. Surely the fish killed and destroyed have va]ue, irrespective of the peculiar na-
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ture of the species. The determination of this question is without doubt, a justiciable question of fact
for a jury.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff submits that there is ample evidence to show the following:
1. That the Utah Division of Fish and Game,
as Trustees of wildlife for the people of the State of
Utah is entitled to sue for injury and destruction of
the wildlife resources. To hold otherwise would be
to deny the state's right to recover for illegal acquisition of minerals, ores, gas, oil, or water rights on
state lands.

2. That a contract existed between the parties
which consists of verbal as well as written representations which is sufficient to determine the intent of the parties.
3. That the Plaintiff is entitled to show or attempt to show what damages it suffered by showing intrinsic or personal value.
4. That all fish for which recovery or compensation is souqht are game fish.
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that there are
numerous issues raised by the pleading which must
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be disposed of by trial and that the trial court
errored in granting the Defendant's Motion For
Summary Judgment, and this case should be remanded to the District Court for trial of the issues.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
KENNETH M. HISATAKE
Special Assistant to
Attorney General
481 South Third East,
Suite 102
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

